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Discussant's Response to 
" 'Under the Spreading Chestnut Tree' 
Accountants' Legal Liability— 
A Historical Perspective" 
Thomas A. Gavin 
The University of  Tennessee at Chattanooga 
Paul has done an excellent job of  developing the history of  accountants' 
legal liability. The message of  the paper is enhanced by his introduction of  some 
of  the cast of  characters who have helped shape the development of  the 
subject—from  the likes of  George May of  Price Waterhouse to Philip Musica, 
alias Frank Donald Coster, of  McKesson & Robbin's. 
My discussion of  the content of  Paul's paper will not address the factual 
settings which underlie the "landmark'' cases presented nor will it address the 
general description of  the all too well known tightening of  accountants' liability. 
Rather, my comments will be restricted to expanding some topics discussed by 
Paul and possibly taking issue with respect to a few. 
Whose Duty to Whom?—Some General Observations 
The author presents the expansion of  the role and responsibilities of  the 
public auditor as one resisted and fought  aggressively by auditors. Further-
more, he notes that "changes were frequently  the result of  litigation losses 
and/or government intervention.'' 
One might respond that the first  of  these observations is accurate but a 
realistic occurrance due in part to a rather young profession  trying to find  its 
way to maturity while at the same time attempting to avoid the risks that might 
abate the maturation process. The second comment about change resulting 
from  litigation could apply to many disciplines. Practicing professionals  do not 
allocate resources to develop procedures to prevent problems unless signifi-
cant problems exist or critical problems are perceived as imminent. Some 
might criticize this rather sympathetic response by stating that the accounting 
profession  has done too little too late. The Moss-Metcalf  and Dingell commit-
tees might be among those critics. 
Professionalism 
I believe the examination of  the legal liability of  accountants cannot be 
viewed as a single issue but must be couched in terms of  the degree or extent 
to which we view accounting as a profession.  The degree of  professionalization 
of  any occupation depends on how many of  the following  characteristics, and 
how much of  each, it possesses: 
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a) General, systematic knowledge. 
b) Authority over clients. 
c) Community rather than self-interest;  symbolic rather than monetary 
rewards. 
d) Self-control. 
e) Recognition by the public and law of  professional  status. 
f)  A distinctive culture. 
Eliot Friedson, on the other hand, contends that the sole defining  characteristic 
of  a profession  is its convincing of  the public and the state of  its right to self-
control over work-related matters (Ritzer, 1972). Students of  accounting 
history would have no problem seeing the relationship between all or part of 
these two definitions  of  a profession  and their own accounting profession. 
A State of  Change 
A seesawing relationship does exist between the development by CPAs of 
professional  auditing standards and the liabilities of  CPAs as public auditors to 
their clients and the public. This seesawing seems quite appropriate given the 
dynamic nature of  both the accounting profession  and our society's social-
economic structure. Organizations and institutions, including professions,  are 
expected to be responsive to the changing needs of  the society in which they 
operate. Unobservant, rigid, and less responsive organizations and professions 
go the way of  the dinosaur. 
Our mission should be to carry on a continuing dialogue with the users of 
our products and services in a positive, nonadversarial way. Unfortunately, 
much of  our profession's  highly publicized communication with users has been 
through their representatives, Moss-Metcalf  and more recently Dignell, and 
the judicial system. More has been written on the users' lack of  understanding 
of  accountants' products and service than has been written to address and 
overcome the problem. 
Sharing the Blame 
The author raises two issues about the responsibility of  employers for  the 
acts of  employees. The first  relates to adverse interest analysis. The second 
relates to the double standard held by the courts; CPA firms  appear to be held 
to a higher standard of  supervision for  their employees than do clients in 
supervising their employees. 
Fraud  or Poor Quality  Control 
Originally, the employer was responsible for  the acts of  his employee 
(agency theory—respondeat supervisor) when the latter acted beyond the 
scope of  employment (adverse to the interest of  the employer) if  the employer 
was "contributorily negligent" because of  failure  to avoid the loss by not 
exercising reasonable care in supervising employee(s). This standard was 
diluted by the "modified  contributory negligence test" which narrowed the 
employer's exposure to liability. The employer now must somehow contribute 
to the auditor's inability to detect the employee's fraud. 
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I would like to make two comments in response to what Paul has said about 
adverse interest analysis. First, as much attention as employees' fraud 
receives and as devastating as it is on employers (clients), the CPA firms,  and 
the shareholders, fraudulent  activities by employees account for  only a small 
percentage of  the accountants' liability problems. St. Pierre and Anderson 
undertook a study which showed that of  334 errors found  in 129 law cases 
examined, only 13 percent related to client (employee) fraud  while 33 percent 
and 15 percent related to problems interpreting accounting principles and 
auditing standards, respectively (St. Pierre and Anderson, 1984). 
Second, the GAO recently issued a report stating that CPAs did not 
satisfactorily  comply with standards on 34 percent of  the governmental audits 
they performed,  and more than half  of  the unsatisfactory  audits had severe 
violations of  standards. Two prominent problems identified  were insufficient 
audit work in testing compliance with governmental laws and regulations and 
the evaluation of  internal accounting controls. Smaller CPA firms  had greater 
problems in complying with standards (GAO, 1986). One might conclude from 
the above discussion that CPAs have a problem with the professional  character-
istic of  "self-control"  as mentioned earlier in my remarks. 
Spotlight  on Management  and the Board 
Let's assume that material employee fraud,  regardless of  the small 
frequency  cited above, induces a state of  trauma for  the client, the public 
auditor, investors and creditors. Are we, as accountants, to accept the courts' 
shifting  of  burden to accountants with the formulation  of  the modified  contrib-
utory negligence test? I think not! Clearly, the courts and users have fallen  into 
the expectation gap, the area where perceived levels of  responsibility for  such 
things as fraud  detection and compilation and review services exceed the 
auditors' actual responsibility as expressed in professional  standards and 
determined by reasonable cost-benefit  considerations. We must educate all 
user groups including primary users such as investors and creditors, as well as 
the secondary user groups composed of  individuals in the judicial and legislative 
branches of  government. 
I do agree with the author that the courts have gone too far  in holding 
auditors more responsible than the client's management and board for  an 
employee's action that is clearly beyond the scope of  legal and reasonable 
business practice. Of  the four  most commonly identified  management functions 
of  planning, organizing, directing, and controlling, the courts seem to be 
overlooking the last of  the four  functions.  Broadly stated, controlling is the 
process by which managers determine whether organizational objectives are 
achieved and whether actual operations are consistent with plans. 
The four  management functions  are interrelated and should not be viewed 
as separate or discrete. All management functions  may be viewed within the 
context of  control systems with the following  objectives (IIA, 1978): 
1. reliability and integrity of  information; 
2. compliance with policies, plans, procedures, laws and regulations; 
3. safeguarding  of  assets; 
4. economical and efficient  use of  resources; and 
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5. accomplishment of  established objectives and goals for  operations 
and programs. 
One might assume that the more effectively  these control objectives are 
achieved, the better the firm's  managment. 
Our socio-economic structure often  permits an inbalance, for  a certain 
period of  time, before  adjustments are subsequently induced to return to what 
society views as an equilibrium. Forces have been at work for  more than ten 
years to induce changes to check the undesirable behavior of  corporate 
managements and boards. These changes include: 
1. passage of  the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of  1977; 
2. adoption of  audit committees by many corporate boards; 
3. introduction and/or enhancement of  the internal audit function  in 
corporations; and 
4. the collapse of  the "good old boys" boardroom environment. 
Collectively, these four  changes have had, and will continue to have, a 
dramatic influence  on improving corporate accountability. An additional poten-
tial influence,  but one that has yet to produce benefits  because its work is not 
completed, is the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. 
Recently, the Commission's chairman, James C. Treadway suggested a 
mandatory expanded role for  internal auditors in some circumstances (IAA, 
1986). 
The items in the two previous paragraphs have heightened the independ-
ence and, in a general professional  sense, the authority of  the public auditor 
over the client. As a result, CPAs now have a stronger degree of  professional-
ism. 
Supervision  of  Staff 
Turning to Paul's comment on the double standard of  the court, i.e., CPA 
firms  appear to be held to a higher standard of  supervision for  their employees 
than do clients in supervising their employees. My response is: why not? 
Professionals  should be held to a higher level of  care than non-professionals. 
Firms that are members of  the AICPA Division of  CPA Firms are obligated 
to adhere to quality control standards promulgated by the institute. Quality 
control standards, among other things, call for  establishing policies and 
procedures for  supervising the work of  firm  personnel. Seven of  the nine 
elements of  quality control relate directly to firm  personnel (AICPA, 1986). 
The fact  that the profession  has taken such a step attests to the fact  that the 
profession  has attempted to meet its responsibility to society. Unfortunately, 
membership in the division is not mandatory for  all firms. 
A Matter of  Perspective 
Any discussion about expanding the classes of  plaintiffs  who should be 
permitted to be successful  in their suit against the auditor is always explosive. 
Discussants generally have a hard time balancing their own economic interests 
with the general social good. 
The courts, social commentators, and critics have had a hard time applying 
existing responsibility models to the accounting profession.  What other 
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profession  gets paid by the party with whom they contracted while the benefits 
of  that relationship flow,  in many cases, to their parties, aptly coined by Judge 
Cardoza, "an indeterminate class"? The courts have had difficulty  reconciling 
the amount of  the public auditor's responsibility with the amount of  loss 
suffered  by potentially great numbers of  people the public auditor himself 
admittedly intends the product of  his attest function  to serve. At the extreme, a 
judge, unfamiliar  with all of  the variables in play, might, after  reading Statement 
of  Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 (FASB, 1978) think that public policy 
dictates that liability for  ordinary negligence be imposed on accountants for 
foreseeable  injuries resulting from  their negligent acts. 
The question is, are society's expectations realistic? Let's explore H. 
Rosenblum, Inc.  v. Adler,  one example that reflects  society's expectations 
through the pen of  the judge who wrote the opinion1. Although the author first 
discusses Citizens  State  Bank v. Timm,  Schmidt  & Co., Rosenblum, Inc.  v. 
Adler  is the initial case to hold accountants liable for  ordinary negligence to 
foreseeable  third parties. On the surface,  the logic underlying the New Jersey 
Supreme Court decision appears sound. However, it is flawed.  The author 
recounts the court's two-step process to determine the accountant's liability. I 
would like to use the same process but take a different  approach than the 
author in responding to the court. 
The court began "first,  we shall consider whether, in the absence of  privity, 
an action for  negligent misrepresentation may be maintained for  economic loss 
against the provider of  a service." The court continued: 
If  recovery for  defective  products may include economic loss, why 
should such loss not be compensable if  caused by negligent misrepre-
sentation? The maker of  the product and the person making a written 
representation with intent that it be relied upon are, respectively, 
impliedly holding out that the product is reasonably fit,  suitable and safe 
and that the representation is reasonably sufficient,  suitable and 
accurate. 
In response, I believe the differences  found  in the comparison made 
between a manufacturer's  product and a public auditor's opinion appear to far 
outweight the similarities. The manufacturer  controls, and is responsible for, 
the process by which the product is made as well as the product resulting from 
that process. Likewise, as pointed out earlier, the client controls, and is 
responsible for,  the adequacy of  the accounting process and its product. The 
public auditor, on the other hand, is charged to test management's assertions 
which are articulated in the financial  statements. A similar position is also held 
by Gormley and Minnow (Gormley, 1984; Minnow, 1984). 
The author then analyzes the court's second question—"what duty should 
the auditor . . . bear to best serve the public interest in light of  the role of  the 
auditor in today's economy?" The duty found  to exist must be equated with 
what is fair;  the analysis of  fairness  "involves a weighing of  the relationship of 
the parties, the nature of  the risks and the public interest in the proposed 
solution.'' 
In response, the courts judging fairness  in terms of  the objectives of 
financial  reporting mentioned earlier totally avoid addressing the broader issue 
which has given rise to the litigation explosion. It appears that the courts have 
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rejected the idea that when professionals  are working at the best of  their ability, 
within the concept of  the average prudent auditor, there are chance occur-
rences that may still befall  the client. The rejection of  this assumption leads the 
courts to accept the idea that all losses shall be borne by someone. This, in 
turn, leads to the notion that the deep pocket has no bottom; a fountain  of  funds 
for  all those who, by mere chance, have suffered  a loss. Courts in New Jersey, 
Wisconsin, and most recently California,  in International  Mortgage  Company v. 
John  P. Butler  Accounting Corporation,  view insurance as a readily available 
vehicle for  making the plaintiff  whole and have extended the accountant's 
liability to foreseeable  parties. Resultant insurance premium increases, the 
courts believe, can be passed along to all consumers. 
The insurance public policy argument has been successfully  employed in 
many other segments of  our society. So successful  has been its use that the 
insurance piggy bank is nearly empty. 
Between 1975 and 1984 product liability cases have increased 600 percent 
to approximately 10,500; suits against officers  and directors have increased 
more than 200 percent during the same time period (Samuelson, 1986). This 
significant  increase in liability cases is due primarily to the self  serving interests 
of  the members of  the Association of  Trial Lawyers, whose ranks tripled in the 
last 15 years to 60,000. This group has placed its own economic interests 
ahead of  the "public interest," or so many believe. A wave of  reforms  are 
under consideration in state capitals and Washington. In Washington, the 
Kasten bill limits the amount of  contingency-fee  lawyers can earn, and also 
restricts joint and several liability (WSJ, 1986). 
Summary and Conclusions 
Survival of  the profession  has and will continue to be measured in terms of 
the ability of  its members to adapt to changes in society. Change should be 
looked upon as an opportunity, an opportunity to serve, grow and mature. 
The application of  extending liability of  accountants to reasonably foreseea-
ble third parties will probably increase beyond the three states where it is now 
applied. The profession  can meet this challenge by aggressively pursuing: 
• A continuing dialogue with users of  financial  statements as to the role 
and responsibilities of  the external auditor, corporate management, 
and boards in the financial  reporting process. 
• Mandatory membership in the AICPA Division for  CPA Firms for  all 
firms. 
• A reasonable limitation, such as a multiple of  the annual audit fee,  on 
the amount of  liability extended to CPA defendants  and elimination of 
joint and several liability. 
End Notes 
1. 461 A 2d 138 (N.J. 1983) 
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